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Abstract 
 
Competition between public and private firms exists in a range of industries like telecommunications, electricity, 
natural gas, airlines industries, as weel as services including hospitals, banking and education. Some authors studied 
mixed oligopolies under Cournot competition (firms move simultaneously) and some others considered Stackelberg 
models (firms move sequentially). Tomaru [1] analyzed, in a Cournot model, how decision-making upon cost-
reducing R&D investment by a domestic public firm is affected by privatization when competing in the domestic 
market with a foreign firm. He shows that privatization of the domestic public firm lowers productive efficiency and 
deteriorates domestic social welfare. In this paper, we examine the same question but in a Stackelberg formulation 
instead of Cournot. The model is a three-stage game. In the first stage, the domestic firm chooses the amount of 
cost-reducing R&D investment. Then, the firms compete à la Stackelberg. Two cases are considered: (i) The 
domestic firm is the leader; (ii) The foreign firm is the leader. We show that the results obtained in [1] for Cournot 
competition are robust in the sence that they are also true when firms move sequentially. 
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